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III.A.6
Divine Hiddenness, Divine Silence
MICHAEL REA
Michael Rea (1968–) is professor of philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, and co-editor of the
present volume. His research focuses primarily on metaphysics and philosophical theology. In the
present article, he explains why divine silence poses a serious intellectual obstacle to belief in God, and
then goes on to consider ways of overcoming that obstacle. After considering several ways in which
divine silence might actually be beneficial to human beings, he argues that perhaps silence is nothing
more or less than God’s preferred mode of interaction with creatures like us. Perhaps God simply
desires communion rather than overt communication with human beings, and perhaps God has
provided ways for us to experience God’s presence richly even amidst the silence.
Several years ago, and a short while after her death,
some of the private writings of Mother Teresa were
published under the title Come Be My Light. The
journal entries were shocking— not because they
disclosed hidden sins or scandals, but because they
revealed something far more troubling. They
painted a picture of a woman celebrated for her
faith and devotion to God but wracked by pain
and doubt for lack of the felt presence of God in
her life—a woman who sought God with tears and
cried out for years for some small taste of the divine,
for some tiny assurance in her soul of God’s love
and presence in her life, but, like so many of the
rest of us, received nothing but silence in response.
In one of the most poignant passages of the book,
she writes:
Lord, my God, who am I that You should
forsake me? The child of your love—and
now become as the most hated one—the
one You have thrown away as unwanted-
unloved. I call, I cling, I want—and there
266 PART III • REL IG IOUS EXPER I ENCE
©
 C
en
ga
ge
 L
ea
rn
in
g.
 A
ll 
rig
ht
s r
es
er
ve
d.
 N
o 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
al
lo
w
ed
 w
ith
ou
t e
xp
re
ss
 a
ut
ho
riz
at
io
n.
is no One to answer—no One on Whom I
can cling—no, No One.—Alone. The
darkness is so dark…The loneliness of the
heart that wants love is
unbearable.—Where is my faith?—even
deep down, right in, there is nothing but
emptiness & darkness.—My God—how
painful is this unknown pain. It pains
without ceasing… I am told God loves
me—and yet the reality of darkness &
coldness & emptiness is so great that
nothing touches my soul. … The whole
time smiling—Sisters & people pass such
remarks.—They think my faith, trust &
love are filling my very being & that the
intimacy with God and union to His will
must be absorbing my heart.—Could they
but know—and how my cheerfulness is
the cloak by which I cover the emptiness
& misery.—What are You doing My God
to one so small? (Mother Teresa, Come Be
My Light: The Private Writings of the Saint of
Calcutta, edited with commentary by Brian
Kolodiejchuk, New York: Doubleday,
2007, pp. 186–87)
What indeed? What are we to make of the silence
of God?
Divine silence—or, as many think of it, divine
hiddenness—is the source of one of the two most im-
portant and widely discussed objections to belief in
God. It is also, I venture to say, one of the most impor-
tant sources of doubt and spiritual distress for religious
believers. Mother Teresa eventually reconciled herself
to a certain extent with God’s hiddenness, but (moving
all the way to the other edge of the continuum) Frie-
drich Nietzsche saw it as just one more reason to sneer
at religious belief. He writes:
A god who is all-knowing and all-powerful
and who does not even make sure his
creatures understand his intention—could
that be a god of goodness? Who allows
countless doubts and uncertainties to
persist, for thousands of years, as though
the salvation of mankind were unaffected
by them, or who, on the other hand, holds
out the prospect of frightful consequences
if any mistake is made as to the nature of
truth? Would he not be a cruel god if he
possessed the truth and could behold
mankind miserably tormenting itself over
that truth?—But perhaps he is a god of
goodness notwithstanding and merely could
express himself more clearly! Did he
perhaps lack the intelligence to do so? Or
the eloquence? So much the worse! For
then he was perhaps also in error as to that
which he calls his “truth,” and is himself
not so very far from being the “poor
deluded devil”! (Daybreak, trans
R. J. Holingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982, pp. 89–90)
It’s pretty clear that Nietzsche thinks that the
existence of an all good, all powerful God is out-
right incompatible with our experience of divine
hiddenness. But why? In the next section of this
article, I will try briefly to answer this question.
That is, I will try briefly to get clear on exactly
what the problem of divine hiddenness is supposed
to be. (Only briefly, though, because I think we all
have at least a basic grasp of what the worry is.)
After that, I’ll spend the remainder of the article
discussing three strategies for dealing with the
problem.
THE PROBLEM OF DIV INE
H IDDENNESS
The problem of divine hiddenness starts with the
supposition that God exists. There is no problem
(for adults) about the hiddenness of Santa Claus,
or of unicorns, or leprechauns, or the like. We sim-
ply don’t believe in these sorts of things. The prob-
lem of divine hiddenness arises under the
supposition—genuine, or “for the sake of argu-
ment”—that God exists. The problem gains trac-
tion because our concept of God is the concept of
a being that we ought to encounter—tangibly and
vividly, it would seem—at some point in our lives.
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Again, there is no real problem of the hiddenness of
abstract objects. Nobody says, “Well, if there are
such things, why don’t they show themselves
once in a while?” They’re just not that sort of thing.
God, however, is supposed to be the sort of being
who would show up once in awhile. But almost
none of us ever really see God, hear God, touch
God, or encounter God in any other palpable
way. Even those who say that God speaks to
them in prayer don’t usually mean that they hear
voices—or have any other experience apart from
the felt conviction that some particular idea they’ve
had is, in some sense, “from the Lord.” That, in a
nutshell, is the problem.
Why do we think that we ought to encounter
God? Simple: Our concept of God is the concept of
a perfectly rational, perfectly wise being who loves
us like a perfect parent. A being like that would
want to have a relationship with us; and we all
know that, in order to have a relationship with
someone, you have to communicate with him or
her. This is why the junior high approach to ro-
mance does not work. You know how this goes:
Boy sees girl; boy likes girl; and…. .boy takes every
possible measure to prevent this fact from becoming
known to girl. If people never grew out of this sort
of immaturity, the human race would die out. So
it’s a safe bet that a perfectly rational God wouldn’t
take this approach in trying to relate to us. So it
stands to reason that God would show up in our
lives once in a while.
More seriously: The theistic religions are in full
agreement about the fact that it is bad for us to spend
our lives without a relationship with God. We all
know that, all else being equal, it is bad for a child
to grow up without a father or a mother, or to
believe—for good reasons or bad—that her father or
mother doesn’t love her. We all know that good
parents go out of their way to talk to their children,
to reassure them of their love, to be present in vivid
and tangible ways—ways that the child can under-
stand and benefit from at whatever stage of life she’s
at— and so on. Good parents don’t lock themselves
in a room day after day, waiting for their children to
acquire the wherewithal to seek them out. Good
parents don’t expect that their children will discover
their love for them simply by way of inference from
the orderliness of the living room and the presence of
fun toys in the basement. Good parents go out of
their way to say, “I love you,” and to hold their
children and to comfort them when they’re sad.
How much more, then, should we expect the
same from a being who (we’re told) loves us like a
perfect parent? If my daughter were crying out for my
presence in the way that Mother Teresa cried out for
God’s, I would move heaven and earth if I could to
be there for her. If my son were in despair because he
thought that he had irreparably disappointed me, I
would hold his hand and tell him that that’s not true.
How could I not? And yet I’m selfish, imperfect,
lacking in resources, and short on wisdom, only hu-
man. How much more then should we expect God
to respond to such cries?
Of course, I don’t mean to suggest that God
would be bound to respond in some very particular
way to us when we cry out for his presence. Nor, I
should think, would God be bound to respond ev-
ery single time. Good parents sometimes turn a deaf
ear to their children’s cries, and often for the child’s
good; they sometimes leave their children with ba-
bysitters (even when it’s not strictly necessary), ig-
noring vehement protests; and so on. So what kind
of encounter with God am I saying that we ought
to expect?
Well, it’s hard to say exactly. But you might
think that, at a minimum we ought to expect at
least one of the following to be the case:
■ Our evidence should be conclusive: It shouldn’t be
the case that one can be fully aware of the
available evidence of God’s existence and at the
same time rationally believe that God does not
exist. OR
■ Experience of God’s love and presence should be
widely available: It shouldn’t be the case that, in
general, people never (or only very rarely) have
experiences that seem to be experiences of the
love or presence of God.
And yet both of these things that seem like they
shouldn’t be the case are the case. It is exactly this
that I have in mind when I say that God is hidden or
silent, and when I say that we don’t encounter God
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often in palpable ways: Our evidence is inconclu-
sive; religious experience—of the interesting and
unambiguous sort—is rare. And it’s really hard to
see any good reason why God might leave matters
this way.
So it looks like we have only three options: (a)
We identify some mistake in our reasoning thus far;
(b) we find some believable, good reason why God
might remain hidden; or (c) we concede that there
is no God. There is really no other way forward.
If you’re interested in identifying a mistake in
the reasoning, it helps to have the premises of the
argument carefully laid out and numbered. Like so:
1. Suppose that God exists—that is, suppose that
there is a perfectly powerful, perfectly wise
being who loves us like a perfect parent.
2. God is mostly hidden from people: Our evi-
dence is inconclusive; religious experience of
the interesting and unambiguous sort is rare.
3. There is no good reason for God to remain
hidden.
4. If God is mostly hidden and there is no good
reason for God to remain hidden, then one of
the following is true:
a. God exists but, like a negligent father, does
not love us enough to make himself known.
b. God exists but, like an inept lover, lacks
the wisdom to appreciate the importance
or proper way of revealing himself to us.
c. God exists but is too weak to reveal
himself in the ways that he should in order
to secure his relational goals.
5. Premises (1)–(4) are inconsistent.
6. Therefore: God does not exist.
This will be our official statement of the prob-
lem of divine hiddenness.1
DEAL ING WITH THE PROBLEM
The advantage to articulating a problem in the way
that I just have—with numbered premises and in-
ferences signaled with “therefore’s”—is that it gives
us a pretty systematic way of addressing the prob-
lem. If premises (1–4) really are inconsistent (and I
think they are, since our concept of God rules out
4a–4c), then one of them is false. The trick then is
to ask about each one, “Is this premise true or false?
And if it is false, why is it false?” In the next few
minutes, I’ll suggest some reasons for thinking that
premises (2) and (3) might be false. My own sym-
pathies lie with those who reject premise (3). But
I’ll start with some thoughts about premise (2).
Conclusive Evidence?
In St. Paul’s epistle to the Romans, Paul writes:
The wrath of God is being revealed from
heaven against all the godlessness and
wickedness of men who suppress the truth
by their wickedness,19 since what may be
known about God is plain to them,
because God has made it plain to them.20
For since the creation of the world God’s
invisible qualities—his eternal power and
divine nature—have been clearly seen,
being understood from what has been
made, so that men are without excuse.21
For although they knew God, they neither
glorified him as God nor gave thanks to
him, but their thinking became futile and
their foolish hearts were darkened. (Rom.
1:18–21; New Revised Standard Version
Bible, copyright 1989, Division of
Christian Education of the National
Council of the Churches of Christ in the
United States of America)
Does it sound like St. Paul would agree with
the claim that God is mostly hidden? No. On Paul’s
view, as some people read it, there is no reasonable
Non-belief: Non-belief is due to sin. Or, a bit more
softly, what passes for non-belief is really a kind of
self-deception. Being an atheist is sort of like being
an alcoholic in denial: You want so badly not to see
the truth that you suppress it and convince yourself
that things are how you want them to be.
This is an offensive doctrine. But I think that it
has to be taken seriously. Self-deception is a real
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phenomenon; and there is nothing at all implausible
about the idea that people would prefer—indeed,
would want very badly—for there to be no God.
One of my colleagues once pointed out that most
sensible people would recoil in horror upon hearing
that a person of great power and influence had
taken a special interest in them and had very defi-
nite, detailed, and not-easily-implemented views
about how they ought to live their lives. Along
the same lines, eminent philosopher Thomas Nagel,
in a now famous chapter entitled “Naturalism and
the Fear of Religion,” writes:
I want atheism to be true and am made
uneasy by the fact that some of the most
intelligent and well-informed people I
know are religious believers. It is not just
that I do not believe in God, and,
naturally, hope that I’m right in my belief.
It’s that I hope there is no God! I do not
want there to be a God; I do not want the
universe to be like that….
My guess is that this cosmic authority
problem is not a rare condition and that it
is responsible for much of the scientism
and reductionism of our time. (The Last
Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2009; pp. 130–131)
So is it really so crazy to think—on the supposition
that there is a God, remember—that many people
would be in the grip of this kind of self-
deception? No. To be sure, the view implies that
a great many people—including many whom we
regard as otherwise very wise and intelligent—
suffer from a kind of deep-seated irrationality. But
I don’t think we should shrink from this sort of
claim on principle. After all, atheists say that sort
of thing about theists all the time.
Still, this is a hard doctrine, and it has some real
problems as a general explanation of the phenome-
non of divine hiddenness. Remember, even believ-
ers struggle with God’s hiddenness. Many people
seem to be utterly broken by divine silence in the
midst of their own suffering or the suffering of
others, or simply by the ongoing and unsatisfied
longing for the presence of God. I’ve seen more
than one friend break down in tears over this sort
of thing. And remember Mother Teresa. Moreover,
many people are atheists or agnostics despite years of
what at least seems to them to be honest seeking after
God. Is it possible that all of these people are radically
self-deceived? Sure. But then we must ask why a
compassionate God would allow such pervasive
and destructive self-deception to go unchecked.
Every day drug, alcohol, and sex addicts, people
with eating disorders and abusive personalities, and
many others as well are made to face up to their own
self-deception and admit to themselves and others
what they very badly want to hide. Often—maybe
mostly—they’re made to do this by someone who
simply confronts them vividly one way or another
with the truth. Why wouldn’t God do that for us?
This question calls out for an answer as much as the
original question of why God would remain hidden
calls out for an answer. So denying that second
premise seems to me to be just a way of relocating
the problem—sort of like pushing around a bulge
under the carpet instead of stomping it out entirely.
And it seems that the only sensible answer is: God
must have some very good reason.
Good Reason?
So now we come to the third premise: Maybe God
does have a good reason for remaining hidden. But
what could such a reason be? Here I want to con-
sider two different kinds of response. One response
says that he does it for our sake. Many philosophers
think that, in general, God could be justified in
permitting suffering of innocents only if the inno-
cents themselves benefit.2 The idea is that a per-
fectly loving being wouldn’t make me suffer for
the benefit of someone else. And even folks who
think that God could allow some people to suffer
for the benefit of others typically think that, at the
very least, there would have to be some benefit to
human beings generally in order for God to be justi-
fied in permitting the evils that come from his re-
maining hidden. The other sort of response denies
this: God has reasons, but his reasons are his own
and have nothing directly to do with benefiting us
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(which is why we often can’t see any benefit to us in
God’s hiddenness). I’ll take each in turn.
So first, what might be some of the ways in
which we (humans generally) could benefit from
divine hiddenness? Here I’ll consider two
suggestions.
First, one might think that hiddenness is neces-
sary for preserving the freedom and integrity of our
own responses to God.
Some folks suggest that if God were to show
himself openly, we would effectively be coerced
into submission. I have kids, and they each in their
own ways sometimes try to manipulate and bully
the other one. I want them to freely choose not to
do this—which means I often don’t appear in the
doorway when I hear that the conditions for ma-
nipulation and bullying are growing ripe. If I appear
in the doorway, they’ll be on their guard; their
freedom to grow will be, in a certain way,
undermined.
That’s one way of pitching the idea that divine
hiddenness might help to preserve our freedom.
But here’s another: Suppose Bill Gates were to go
back on the dating scene. Wouldn’t it be natural for
him to want to be with someone who would love
him for himself rather than for his resources? Yet
wouldn’t it also be natural for him to worry that
even the most virtuous of prospective dating part-
ners would find it difficult to avoid having her
judgment clouded by the prospect of living in un-
imaginable wealth? The worry wouldn’t be that
there would be anything coercive about his impres-
sive circumstances; rather, it’s that a certain kind of
genuineness in a person’s response to him is made
vastly more difficult by those circumstances. But, of
course, Bill Gates’s impressiveness pales in compari-
son with God’s; and, unlike Gates, God’s resources
and intrinsic nature are so incredibly impressive as
to be not only overwhelmingly and unimaginably
beautiful but also overwhelmingly and unimagin-
ably terrifying. Viewed in this light, it is easy to sup-
pose that God must hide from us if he wants to
allow us to develop the right sort of non-
self-interested love for him.
Note too that if this is God’s motivation, divine
hiddenness is as much for our benefit as God’s.
Which brings me to the second, but related, “ben-
efit to us” strategy for understanding divine hid-
denness. Perhaps God’s hiddenness is good for our
souls. Perhaps it helps to produce virtues in us that
we wouldn’t otherwise acquire. Maybe it teaches us
to seek God, to hunger and thirst after him, to not
take him for granted. Much in the scriptures sug-
gests that this is what God wants for us. The psalm-
ist writes, “As a deer longs for flowing streams, so
my soul longs for you, O God,” (Ps. 42:1, New
Revised Standard Bible) and the idea seems clearly
to be that we all should long after God in this
way. Likewise, at one point in the Gospels Jesus
gives thanks to God for hiding certain things from
those who are not seeking him; and he admonishes
us to ask, seek, and knock (Mt. 11:25; Mt. 7:7). God
wants us to be seekers after him, and what better
way to cultivate that disposition than to hide?
Or maybe divine hiddenness teaches us that
God cannot be manipulated by us—that God is
not at our beck and call. We cannot summon
God by performing the right sorts of incantations;
God is maximally free, maximally authoritative, and
will be manipulated by no one. This too might be a
lesson that is good for us to learn, and so it, too,
might be among the purposes of divine hiddenness.
The Personality of God?
Or maybe … just maybe … although divine hid-
denness often does have these salutary effects, and
others, that still is not their point at all.
The last suggestion I’d like to consider is one
that sees divine hiddenness not as something that
God does to produce some great good for us, but
rather as something that God engages in for his own
reasons, independently of (though not in violation
of) our good. Throughout this talk I have some-
times used the term divine silence to refer to the
phenomenon of hiddenness. I think that that’s a
more fruitful way of thinking of God’s mode of
interaction with us. And what I want to suggest is
that perhaps divine silence is nothing more or less
than an expression of God’s personality.
Remember our problem: We experience di-
vine silence and, under the assumption that God
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exists, we ask, “What’s his problem? Doesn’t he love
me? Doesn’t he care? Doesn’t he understand that you
have to talk to people to relate to them? What kind of
father is he?” The objections implied by these rhe-
torical questions are altogether natural, but they are
flawed. They are flawed in just the same way in
which complaints about the behavior of human
persons are often flawed: They depend on a partic-
ular interpretation of behavior that can in fact be
interpreted in a number of different ways, depend-
ing upon what assumptions we make about the
person’s beliefs, desires, motives, dispositions, and
overall personality.
Someone from your school doesn’t greet you
in the hallway. Have you hurt her feelings? Does
she think you’re a fool and not want to be seen
talking to you? Does she think so poorly of herself
that she thinks you wouldn’t want to be seen talking
to her? Is she depressed and having a bad day? As a
matter of fact, she’s the class genius—beautiful
mind sort of genius—and she’s always off in her
own world, introverted and totally preoccupied.
Does that affect your interpretation of her
behavior?
You’re on a first date. After a while you notice
that you’ve been doing almost all the talking. You
start asking questions to draw her out, but her an-
swers are brief, and the silences in between grow
longer and longer. You spend the entire ride home
without saying a word. Does she hate you? Does
she find you boring? Have you offended her? Or is
she just rude? As it happens, she just arrived in the
United States and was raised with the view that if
you really want to win a man over, you should be
quiet and let him do all the talking. Does that in-
formation affect your interpretation?
My point? Interpreting silence requires a lot of
information about what sort of person you’re deal-
ing with—about the person’s cultural background,
about what sorts of social norms he or she is likely
to recognize and respect, about his or her views
about what various kinds of behavior (both verbal
and not) communicate to others, about his or her
general “style” of interacting with other people,
about what’s going on in his or her life, and so
on. But if this is what it takes to interpret the
behavior of an ordinary human person, imagine
how difficult it must be to interpret the behavior
of an invisible and transcendent divine person.
Seen in this light, the suggestion that divine
silence in and of itself somehow indicates disinterest
or lack of love and concern on God’s part is absurd.
God is as alien and “wholly other” from us as it is
possible for another person to be. So isn’t it almost
ridiculous to think that we would have any idea
what divine silence would indicate? To assume
that divine silence indicates a lack of concern for
us involves quite a lot of unwarranted assumptions
about the degree to which divine modes of interac-
tion would likely resemble 21st-century human
modes of interaction.
Granted, divine silence would indicate a lack of
concern for rational creatures if we had good reason
to think that God had provided no way for us to
find him or to experience his presence in the midst
of his silence. This would indicate a lack of concern
because it would indicate that God is trying to pre-
vent us from finding him, or at least doing nothing
to help, and thus bringing about something that is
both intrinsically very bad for us and totally beyond
our control. But as far as I can tell, we don’t have
good reason for thinking that God has left us with-
out any way of finding him or experiencing his
presence.
I think that we have a tendency to assume that
we can experience God’s presence only if we tan-
gibly perceive something—a voice, a vision, an ache
in our stomachs or our heads, a tingly feeling of
some sort. But experiencing the presence of a per-
son sometimes involves none of this. Sometimes it
is just a matter of the person being present, together
with our believing that she is present and taking a
certain attitude toward her presence. Consider:
You’re studying in the library. You look up and
you see a reflection in the window: The girl you’ve
been in love with all year but never had the cour-
age to ask out has entered the library behind you.
Without seeing you, she turns down the aisle of
books adjacent to yours—just a single stack of
shelves separates you—and takes up a seat. She’s
out of your view, but is there any doubt that you’ll
experience her presence? And you would, even
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apart from the initial glimpse that alerted you to her
presence—all you’d need to experience it—to gen-
uinely experience it—is the true conviction that she’s
right there on the other side of those books, to-
gether with a certain kind of attention and attitude
toward that conviction.
In her book A Wind in the Door, Madeline
L’Engle makes this point very nicely by way of
the distinction between communication and
communion:
“Hey, Meg! [says Calvin] Communication
implies sound. Communion doesn’t.” He
sent her a brief image of walking silently
through the woods, the two of them alone
together, their feet almost noiseless on the
rusty carpet of pine needles. They walked
without speaking, without touching, and
yet they were as close as it is possible for
two human beings to be. … Mr. Jenkins
had never had that kind of communion
with another human being, a communion
so rich and full that silence speaks more
powerfully than words.” (A Wind in the
Door, New York: Farrar, Straus, and
Giroux, 1973, p. 171)
And, of course, silent communion is not the only
way to experience a person unseen. Think of times
when you relay a story about an encounter with
another person and, after a bit of effort, you falter
and say, “Well, you just had to be there.” What
you communicate, I think, is that your words
have failed at their goal—the goal of putting us there,
of mediating to us an experience of a person we don’t see
and maybe have never met. Sometimes we do fail in
that way, but often we succeed. When you say
“You just had to be there,” nobody ever says,
“Well, of course! You always have to be there;
you simply can’t convey an experience like that in
words!” Stories about other persons can mediate their
presence to us—they can give us a taste of what it is
like to be in the presence of the person, sort of like memo-
ries give us a taste of what it is like to be in the presence of
the remembered event, even when we ‘re not. Again,
though, it matters that we believe that the person
reporting the events in question is reporting events
involving real persons. When we do, we can be
transported and get at least a bit of what it’s like
to be around the person we’re being told about.
And this, it seems, is what biblical narrative—and,
to a certain extent, the liturgies of the church—can
do for us when we approach them with eyes of
faith.3
My claim, then, is that divine silence might just
be an expression of God’s preferred mode of inter-
action, and that we need not experience his silence
as absence—especially if we see Biblical narratives
and liturgies as things that in some sense mediate
the presence of God to us, if we live out our lives
in the conviction that God is ever present with us,
and if we seek something more like communion with
God rather than just communication.
The pressing question, however, is what to do
with the fact that God’s silence is painful for us.
Many believers experience crippling doubt, over-
whelming sadness, and ultimate loss of faith as a
result of ongoing silence from their heavenly Fa-
ther. On the assumption that God exists and that
a loving relationship with God is a great good, it
would appear that many people have been posi-
tively damaged by divine silence. Isn’t it just this
that leads us to take divine silence as evidence of
God’s lack of concern? Perhaps silence is just an
expression of God’s personality, but then, the ob-
jector might say, God’s personality is just that of an
unloving and inattentive parent.
The problem with this objection is that it
completely ignores the fact that sometimes our be-
ing pained by another person’s behavior is our prob-
lem rather than theirs—due to our own
dysfunctional attitudes and ways of relating to
others, our own epistemic or moral vices, our
own immaturity, and the like. In such cases, it is
our responsibility to find a way out of our suffering
rather than the other person’s responsibility to stop
behaving in the ways that cause us pain. And maybe
this is how it is with divine silence, too. Maybe our
suffering in the face of divine silence is unreason-
able, due more to our own immaturity or dysfunc-
tion than to any lack of kindness on God’s part.
Maybe it is a result of our own untrusting, unchari-
table interpretations of divine silence, or an
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inappropriate refusal to accept God for who God is
and to accept God’s preferences about when and in
what ways to communicate with us. And maybe
there are ways of experiencing the world that are
fully available to us, if only we would strive for
maturity in the ways that we ought to, that would
allow us to be content with or even to appreciate
the silence of God in the midst of our joys and
sufferings. Coping with divine silence, then, would
just be a matter of finding these more positive ways
of experiencing it.
It helps, in this vein, to be reminded of a fact
about God and a fact about ordinary human rela-
tionships. The fact about God is that the most enig-
matic, eccentric, and complicated people we might
ever encounter in literature or in real life are, by
comparison with God, utterly familiar and mun-
dane. The fact about human relationships is that
experiencing the silence of another person can, in
the right context and seen in the right way, be an
incredibly rich way of experiencing the person—all
the more so with a person who is sufficiently be-
yond you in intellect, wisdom, and virtue. A wise
and virtuous person who is utterly beyond you in-
tellectually and silently leads you on a journey that
might teach you a lot more about herself and about
other things on your journey than she would if she
tried to tell you all of the things that she wants to
teach you. In such a case, objecting to the silence,
interpreting it as an offence, or wishing that the
person would just talk to you rather than make
you figure things out for yourself might just be
childish—an immature refusal to tolerate legitimate
differences among persons and to be charitable in
the way that you interpret another’s behavior. And
there is no reason to think that the person would
owe it to you to cater to these objections—even if
her decision to be silent was arrived at not for the
sake of your greater good, but simply because that’s
who she is, and that’s how she prefers to communicate
with people like you.
You might be tempted to object that, on this
view, God is like a father who neglects his children,
leaving them bereft and unloved while he sits in
stony silence thinking “I just gotta be me.” But to
object like this is to fail to take seriously the idea
that God might have a genuine, robust personality
and that it might be deeply good for God to live out
his own personality. One odd feature of much con-
temporary philosophy of religion is that it seems to
portray God as having a “personality” that is almost
entirely empty, allowing his behavior to be almost
exhaustively determined by facts about how it
would be best for others for an omnipotent being
to behave. But why should we think of God like
this? God is supposed to be a person not only of
unsurpassable love and goodness but of unsurpass-
able beauty. Could God really be that sort of person
if he’s nothing more than a cosmic, others-oriented,
utility-maximizing machine? On that way of think-
ing, God—the being who is supposed to be a per-
son par excellence—ends up having no real self. So, as
I see it, silence of the sort we experience from God
might just flow out of who God is, and it might be
deeply good for God to live out his personality. If that’s
right, and if our suffering in the face of divine si-
lence is indeed unreasonable, the result of immatu-
rity or other dysfunctions that we can and should
overcome anyway, then I see no reason why even
perfect love would require God to desist from his
preferred mode of interaction in order to alleviate
our suffering
On the view that I am developing, then, it is
not true that divine silence serves no greater good.
Rather, it serves the good that comes of the most
perfect and beautiful person in the universe expres-
sing himself in the way that he sees fit. This is good
on its own terms, and it is justified if—as theists
generally believe—God has provided ways (not
our preferred ways, but ways nonetheless) of find-
ing and experiencing his presence despite his si-
lence. And if, as I have suggested, there are ways
of experiencing divine silence that we would find
non-burdensome or even beautiful, and if God’s
persisting in his silence provides opportunities for
us to grow in maturity or in our ability to relate
to others, then divine silence might even be good
for us.4
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NOTES
1. The most widely discussed articulation of the
problem of divine hiddenness is J.L. Schellenberg’s
Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Ithaca, NY:
Cambridge University Press). Divine Hiddenness:
New Essays, edited by Daniel Howard-Snyder and
Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002) is another important volume which
includes both further articulations of the problem
as well as a variety of responses. All but the last of
the responses that I present in the section entitled
“Dealing with the Problem” are represented and
defended in some detail in that volume. Finally, see
also Ted Poston and Trent Dougherty, “Divine
Hiddenness and the Nature of Belief,” Religious
Studies 43 (2007): 183–98, and my “Narrative,
Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God,” pp. 76–96,
in Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore
Stump, edited by Kevin Timpe (New York:
Routledge, 2009).
2. See, e.g., Eleonore Stump, “The Problem of Evil,”
Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 393–423, and
“Providence and the Problem of Evil,” pp. 51–91
in Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas P. Flint
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1990). For critical discussion of this principle, along
with references to other philosophers who endorse
it, see Jeff Jordan, “Divine Love and Human
Suffering,” International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 56 (2004): 169–78.
3. I develop this idea in more detail in “Narrative,
Liturgy, and the Hiddenness of God.” The idea
takes inspiration from recent work by Eleonore
Stump—especially her Wandering in Darkness
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
4. This essay has been given as a talk aimed at
undergraduate and non-academic audiences on
several occasions, most recently at Wake Forest
University and Bethel College, South Bend. It is
published here for the first time.
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